This paper analyzes the accountability of coalition governments concentrating on the moral hazard aspect of politics. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable as long as the opposition provides an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the next elections. Such a coalition can not be given appropriate (collective) incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one of the coalition parties responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in the reduction of government performance. The paper analyzes the resulting con ‡ict and characterizes optimal voter strategy. Coalitions of this type, also called 'unity governments' form in the presence of extreme parties in proportional electoral systems.
Introduction
Do coalition governments su¤er from an accountability de…cit? When do elections provide the right incentives to coalition governments and when do they fail to do so? Are there situations when reelection incentives induce a con ‡ict among government parties? These questions are addressed in the present paper in a simple political economics framework.
The accountability de…cit of coalition governments is a signi…cant, but often implicit, theoretical hypothesis behind many empirical studies in public …nance and political economics. In the study of public debt, many explanations for why coalition governments may run higher budget de…cits refer to ine¢ ciencies of coalition decision making. Such explanations include the collective action problem (or 'common pool'problem) in the spending of public funds, the lack of commitment power of coalition partners, and the high number of veto players (see the seminal work of Roubini and Sachs (1989) and the recent survey by Ashworth et al. (2005) ). These arguments, however, do not take into account the in ‡uence of elections on the actions of governments. If there is a high probability that voters remove governments after poor outcomes, coalitions have an incentive to solve the collective action problem.
The theoretical analysis of political accountability, initiated by the work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , concentrates on the moral-hazard aspect of politics: the con ‡ict of interest between citizens (principals) and politicians (agents). Examples of this con ‡ict of interest are given by corruption and the diversion of public funds by politicians to projects of their preference. Alternatively, one may think of politicians as investing costly e¤ort in the e¢ cient functioning of the state, which is bene…cial for the citizens. Voters can make the incumbent act in their interest by o¤ering the reward of reelection in case of good outcomes. 1 For an overview of the issues related to political accountability 1 Beside the moral-hazard aspect, some analyses (see Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Besley and Case (1995) ) introduced an adverse-selection element to the analysis of political accountability. Voters in these frameworks would like to discipline politicians, but also choose the more able ones. While in most studies the ability of voters to hold politicians accountablte is welfare-improving, in recent analyses, Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) point out potential weaknesses of political accountability.
see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) .
The literature has so far concentrated of the accountability of a single decision maker. The contribution of this paper is to analyze the accountability of coalition governments, that is multiple decision makers contributing to government policy. To this end, a simple, two-period, pure-moral-hazard framework is chosen.
Related to the present paper is the analysis by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) who also study the accountability of multiple decision makers (politicians). In their framework, however, both decision makers are accountable separately to the electorate, similarly to the president and the congress in a presidential system. This arrangement allows the authors to analyze the e¤ect of 'checks and balances'in a political system. In our framework, the decisionmakers are part of the same elected body, and therefore cannot provide checks and balances against each-other.
To anticipate the results, the analysis suggests that coalition government does not necessarily hamper political accountability. Coalition governments can be given appropriate (collective) incentives as long as the opposition provides a real electoral alternative. This result is an application of the theory of team production, or 'moral hazard in teams,'as analyzed by Holmstrom (1982) . 2 The possibility of reelection is a very speci…c type of contract between the principal (voter) and the team of agents (coalition government). Yet, as it is shown by Homstrom (1982) , it is exactly this kind of contract, a discreet team bonus, that solves the moral-hazard problem in teams.
The accountability of a coalition government becomes problematic when, in the absence of a real electoral alternative, the government cannot be removed as a whole. The coalition parties can thus not be given the appropriate team incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters have to make one of the coalition parties responsible for the outcome. This creates incentives for the other party to reduce (or 'sabotage') government performance. In this way, a con ‡ict emerges between the parties of a unity government, taking the form of a socially costly contest. The resulting contest between the parties is most closely related to a tournament with 'handicap'or 'headstart advantage'
analyzed by Konrad (2002) . 3 As a di¤erence to that paper, where the handicap is an exogeneous e¤ect related to technology, here it is endogeneously determined by the voter's strategy. Accordingly, in this paper, we solve for the 'optimal handicap'as chosen by the voters. It is shown that voters can secure a positive expected payo¤ even when facing a unity government. It is, however, as low as one-fourth of the payo¤ that voters can get in the presence of an electoral alternative.
The government form corresponding to this theoretical description is the 'unity government'or, as it is known in some countries, the 'Grand Coalition,'a coalition including the major centre-left and -right parties of a political system.
In line with the theoretical analysis, 'unity government' can be de…ned as the situation where it is known that (at least) one of the government parties stays or 'anti-system'parties. 4 Since coalition government is a characteristic government form of proportional electoral systems, the implications of the analysis are of signi…cance for the study of proportional representation (PR). According to the present analysis the Achilles'heel of PR seems to be that the emergence of 'extreme'parties disrupt the alternation of governments, forcing the formation of a unity government. A possible normative implication is that extreme movements should be moderated and accommodated by a political system based on PR to preserve the possibility of alternating governments and, with that, government accountability. The electoral bloc winning the election receives a rent of value v. If the incumbent bloc remains in power, the factions share the rent according to exogenously given proportions i ; i 2 fM; N g with i > 0 and P i = 1: Speci…cally, the payo¤ of faction i, i = fM; N g is given as
At the beginning of the game, voters coordinate on a voting strategy. We consider the following class of voter strategies: The representative voter I will parties in many European countries and, less controversially, in the case of Green parties. Such an outcome can not be seen in the case of the extreme right movements of Europe.
vote for electoral bloc i, i 2 fL; Rg; if e > e; e 2 R + , otherwise she will vote for bloc j 2 fL; Rg; j 6 = i: Thus, a strategy is given by the pair fi; eg. Such strategies are sometimes referred to as 'simple retrospective voting rules'(e.g.
Persson et al., 1997).
The sequence of events is as follows: (1 Proof. We solve the game backwards. Since voters are indi¤erent between the electoral blocs at the election stage, it is (weakly) optimal for them to execute their announced voting strategy, whatever that is. We can now turn to the e¤ort stage. Taking e¤ort e j ; j 2 fM; N g as given, faction i (i 2 fM; N g; i 6 = j) compares two relevant alternatives: exerting just enough e¤ort to satisfy the voters or no e¤ort at all. Satisfying the voters is optimal if i v (e e j ) > 0 6 Other SPE can be supported by less plausible beliefs on the politicians'side. For instance, there exists a SPE where politicians expect never to be reelected whatever the announced voting strategy was. Thus, they exert no e¤ort. Since voters expect never to see positive e¤ort, they are (weakly) best-responding by never reelecting the incumbent (independently of e¤ort).
which is equivalent to the condition i v > e e j : This expression is an incentive constraint: faction i will not exert more e¤ort than i v to gain reelection. The sum of e¤orts can thus never exceed v in equilibrium. If, however, voters set The result is not dependent on the number of factions that constitute the incumbent electoral bloc. What is crucial, however, is the presence of an electoral alternative to the incumbent government. The ability to 'reward' or 'punish' the government as a whole allows the voters to give appropriate team incentives to the incumbent factions.
Accountability of the unity government
When does electoral accountability become problematic? As the analysis of the previous section shows, voters can always provide appropriate team incentives for the government as long as there is an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that (at least) one of the governing parties stays in power after the elections. As we argued in the Introduction, this corresponds to the real-life government form that is often called a 'unity government'or, in other countries, a 'Grand Coalition. ' We model this as a situation without an opposition. The only thing voters can do is to choose between the government parties.
7 7 In the formulation presented here, the unity government cannot be an outcome of the election. This inconsistency can be remedied in a more complex voting game without changing the qualitative results of the analysis. In particular, a voting game with a stochastic element, Two further conditions are necessary for political accountability not to work in our framework. The …rst is that the e¤ort of the government parties cannot be disentangled by the voters. They observe only the sum of e¤orts, that is, only one measure of government performance. The other condition is that 'sabotage'
(costly e¤ort reducing government performance) is possible. 8 These conditions
do not represent a departure from the framework presented in the analysis of electoral blocs. Clearly, none of the factions had an incentive to engage in sabotage in that context. Further discussion of the importance of these conditions will be provided after the main results.
Consider a political system with two o¢ ce-motivated parties, L and R, both in government at the beginning of the game. The parties choose e¤ort e i 2 R; i 2 fL; Rg simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Note that negative e¤ort is possible, but is costly; the cost of e¤ort is equal to je i j. There is a continuum of identical voters. The voters observe only the sum of e¤orts, e = e L + e R .
The voters'utility w is given by w = e. After e becomes public, elections are held, where voters can choose between the incumbent parties L and R. The representative voter I wants to induce a high e¤ort by the government parties with her voting behavior, and is inherently indi¤erent between the two parties at the election stage. The party that wins the election receives a rent of value v i ; i 2 fL; Rg. Note that in this case, parties may have di¤erent valuations of winning. We will discuss the special case when the valuations are equal. Party i's (i 2 fL; Rg) payo¤ is thus:
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The voters announce a voting strategy (see below). (2) The parties choose their respective e¤orts e i ; i = an additional extreme party and a division of voters to 'party-comitted' and 'independent' ones was described in an earlier version of this paper and is available on request. 8 The problem of sabotage enjoyed some attention by the researchers of tournaments. An early and in ‡uential analysis of such ativities in tournaments is by Lazear (1989) . More recent analyses are by Konrad (2000) , Chen (2003) and Münster (2006) . Our setup di¤ers from these in that sabotage is not described as a separate (second) instrument of the players, but rather as adverse e¤ort. The terminology is used because this counter-e¤ort hurts government performance.
fL; Rg. The sum of e¤orts e is observed by the voters. (3) Elections take place.
The newly elected government earns the rents from o¢ ce and the game ends.
We consider the same class of voter strategies as in the previous section: a strategy is given by a pair fi; eg. The representative voter I will vote for party i, i 2 fL; Rg; if and only if e > e, e 2 R. Otherwise she will vote for party j 2 fL; Rg; j 6 = i. Note that the payo¤ of party j is strictly monotonously decreasing in e¤ort. Beside the fact that e¤ort is costly, the higher the government e¤ort the less probable that party j wins the elections. On the other hand, the payo¤ of party i has a discrete positive jump in e¤ort (when e j is kept constant). Thus we can say that voter strategy gives 'positive incentives'to party i and 'negative incentives' to party j. This means that if sabotage (costly negative e¤ort) is possible, party j has an incentive to employ it. Therefore, we expect e i > 0 and E(e); with E(e) = E(e L + e R ) = E(e i s j ):
To solve the game we apply the equilibrium selection criteria discussed in Section 2. The parties expect voters to execute their announced voting strategy, and voters indeed do so, since it is weakly optimal for them. Each point in the voters' strategy space implements an all-pay auction with a handicap. The voters choose optimally from a restricted set of strategies.
Proposition 2 Let us assume, without loss of generality
There is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which voters choose party R if e > e; and L otherwise; the optimally chosen reservation utility is e = maxf
then the (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium of the e¤ ort subgame is described by following cumulative distribution functions:
(ii) If
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the case where v R = v L = v; the limit of the Proposition can be applied. The following example may give an intuition for Proposition 2. Let us assume that v R > v L : We will solve for the equilibrium party behavior for the case when voters in the …rst stage chose a retrospective voting strategy described by the pair fR; eg with e > v R v L : That is, voters choose party R if e > e and party L otherwise.
We can write the expected payo¤s of the parties as follows:
As it is established in the analysis of all-pay auctions, this type of game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. We will follow the literature to …nd the mixed strategy equilibrium. 9 First, no party will choose a 'bid'(that is, e¤ort or sabotage) that is higher than its valuation, since such a choice gives a negative payo¤ with certainty.
Also, no party will bid below zero, since such a bid is costly and reduces the party's chances of winning compared to bidding zero. Party R thus loses with certainty for any bid e R < e; since such a bid loses against the smallest possible bid of the opponent, s L = 0: Therefore, R will not put forward any positive bid below e. On the other hand, party L can secure the prize with a bid of As all actions that a player randomizes over have to give the same expected payo¤, we can reach the following equation for party L's actions s L . 
9 See, for example, Hirschleifer and Riley (1992, Section 10.1.2) and Konrad (2002) . The uniqueness of this equilibrium can be shown analogously to the uniqueness proof of Baye et al. (1996) .
Note that R's bid distribution function has a mass point on zero (since we know he will not bid between zero and e). Similarly, the equation that describes the expected payo¤ of R's actions, H L (e R e)v R e R = 0; helps us …nd the solution
Thus L's bid function also has a mass point on zero. The bid distributions constitute an equilibrium, since they were constructed so. Further, the distribution functions allow us to calculate the expected payo¤ of the voters in equilibrium. at the same time be severely handicapped in the voters'optimum.
From Proposition 2 we can calculate voters'payo¤ as
The …rst line simpli…es to
Thus, voters get a positive expected payo¤ even facing a unity government and the possibility of sabotage.
Voter payo¤ is, however, dramatically reduced as compared to the case when an opposition is present. (There, as we saw, voters can receive the full rent v). This is true because the positive e¤ort of the one party is lower than valuation v with probability 1, while the other party engages in sabotage activity.
It remains to discuss the importance of the two assumptions mentioned above: the possibility of sabotage and the non-observability of individual party e¤ort. It is easy to see that, if sabotage is not possible, voters could give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation without inducing outright con ‡ict. In that case, again, full rent can be extracted from the party. If, on the other hand, the e¤ort of each party were observed, voters would have no reason to condition their voting strategy on the sum of e¤orts. Instead, they could induce a 'bene…cial'tournament announcing that the party with the higher e¤ort will gain their support.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the political accountability of coalitions in a pure-moralhazard framework. The political accountability of coalition governments is related to the problem of moral hazard in teams.
It is shown that a coalition government can be held accountable as long as there is an electoral alternative. Voters can always threaten not to reelect the government, which gives the appropriate team incentives to the government.
The accountability of coalition governments becomes problematic if the voters have no electoral alternative. In this case it is certain that (at least) one of the incumbent parties remain in power after the next elections. Voters can not give appropriate team incentives to the government, but only choose between the incumbent parties. We showed that even in this situation, voters can induce a positive expected government performance by making one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This voting strategy creates a con ‡ict among the government parties, making one party interested in reducing government output. The paper solves for the optimal strategy of the voters as 'designers'of the resulting contest between the government parties.
The theoretical description of a coalition government with no electoral alternative corresponds to the real-life examples of 'unity government' or, as it is known in some countries, 'Grand Coalition.' Such coalitions of the main centre-left and centre-right parties typically form in political systems with Proportional Representation (PR) in the presence of extreme parties. Thus, the analysis points at a speci…c source of accountability de…cit in PR systems.
The analysis also provides a counter-argument to the arguments of 'coalition ine¢ ciency'often cited in empirical analyses. Such arguments do not take into account the role of elections. Even if coalitions do face collective action problems, they also have an incentive to overcome them if their reelection probability decreases after ine¢ cient outcomes. The possibility of (no) reelection gives the politicians incentives to act in the citizens'interest.
As an implication for empirical research, it appears that the number of parties included in a government coalition (the variable universally used in empirical work to control for blurred responsibility) may not be the most informative variable. The political constellation in which a (coalition) government operates should play a crucial role. Speci…cally, it could be useful to identify the weight of extreme parties in the legislature, since this shows ultimately whether there 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We assumed, without loss of generality, that v R > v L : We can divide the representative voter I's strategy space ffi; eg 2 fR; Lg Rg to six ranges. These di¤er along two dimensions: 1) whether the voters give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation (whether i = R) or to the party with the lower valuation (i = L); and 2) in which of three intervals the reservation utility e is chosen. The reason to separate exactly these ranges is that the resulting all-pay auction has a di¤erent mixed-strategy equilibrium in each of them. In each strategy range we …rst characterize equilibrium party behavior for a given e and search for the voter's optimal choice of e within the given range: Then we will be able to make a global statement about I 0 s optimal strategy. 
To check that this constitutes an equilibrium, note that L has a negative payo¤ for all bids below 0 or above his valuation The representative voter, seeking to choose the best e in the relevant interval v R v L > e > 0; wants to maximize e = e R s L : She notes that her choice does not a¤ect L's optimal strategy, but that a higher e translates one-to-one to higher e¤ort e R (in a stochastic sense). Therefore the voter's best option is to choose the upper limit of this interval, that is, e = v R v L : Her expected payo¤ is then 
H R (e R ) =
for e 6 e R 6 v R
Following the same steps as in Range 1, it can be shown that this constitutes an equilibrium. Now we can turn to the voters'problem.
Here, the …rst equation comes from the fact that the parties randomize independently from each-other, the second uses the usual de…nition of the expected value of a continuous variable, where mass points at zero can be suppressed.
Note that the bid densities are constant on the relevant intervals. Now it is easy to evaluate the integrals to get
We get the …rst-order condition by di¤erentiating this last expression by e and equating the result with zero. This gives us e =
The second-order condition is clearly ful…lled. But we have to make sure that the optimum lies in the considered range e > v R v L . This is the case if v R 6
. To summarize, in this range, voter I's optimal choice for the 'handicap'e is given by 
The objective function of the voter is
This expression describes a convex parabola. On the one end of the relevant range, at e = 0; the pay-o¤ is positive, then it decreases below zero as e decreases only to start to rise again, reaching zero at e = v L : For higher performance thresholds voter payo¤ is constant zero, since the outcome of the game is trivial:
no party exerts e¤ort as L cannot win. Thus, the optimal 'headstart advantage' in this range is e = 0:
Range 4: Give positive incentives to the party with the lower valuation and give him a slight headstart advantage. Suppose voter I's strategy is given by the pair fL; eg with v L v R 6 e 6 0. Then, the equilibrium bid functions resemble those found in Range 1. 11 Also, just as in Range 1, party L's optimal strategy is not a¤ected by the choice of handicap. Voter payo¤ is
This expression is monotone increasing in e, so the optimal choice is given by the upper corner e = 0. Note that voter payo¤ is negative at this point. 
This is another case where the objective is a convex parabola. Possibilities for the optimum are e = v L v R and e = v R : Calculating the payo¤ for e = v L v R , we …nd a negative payo¤
At the same time, e = v R (and any choice below that) implements a trivial auction where bids equal zero and L always wins. This option delivers zero payo¤ to I and is therefore optimal within this range. 
Note that this objective is identical to the one found in Range 2 up to the constant. (Note also that the constant here is negative while it is positive for Range 2.) Therefore, the optimal handicap is the same as there, e =
(here unconstrained). The voter's payo¤ is compared below.
The global optimum. After calculating the optimum in each of these ranges we are to rank these (restricted) optima. We will show that the Range-2-optimum represents a global optimum, which proves the Proposition.
First note that Ranges 4 and 5 cannot produce a positive payo¤ to I, they are thus strictly inferior to Range 1.
Second, note that all strategy ranges are de…ned such as to include interval limits. This is useful because Range 3 has a corner solution which is an available option in adjacent Range 1. Similarly, Range 1 exhibits a corner solution which is an available option in adjacent Range 2. Therefore, the optimal strategy in Range 2 represents the optimum over Ranges 1, 2, and 3, 4 and 5.
The last step is to show that the optimal strategy in Range 2 is superior to that in Range 6. Here we have to distinguish to cases.
Here the optimum in Range 2 is e =
just as in Range 6. We have noted that voter I's objective di¤ers across the two Ranges only by a constant. Evaluated at the same reservation utility e, voter I 0 s payo¤ is strictly higher in Range 2.
Here, in Range 2 we have a corner solution at e = v R v L giving a payo¤ of
to I. We can express I's payo¤ at the optimum in Range 6 as
where we used Case B's de…ning inequality. To show that the optimum in Range 6 is inferior to the one of Range 2, we need
which is ful…lled as
This completes the proof.
